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OPINION OF THE COURT 
 
COWEN, Circuit Judge. 
 
I. 
 
On April 9, 1999, Richard Allen Wolfe r obbed the Penn 
Security Bank and Trust Company. He walked into the 
bank, approached the teller with his hand in his jacket, 
handed her a bag and instructed her to fill it with money. 
He then told her he had a gun and would shoot. When the 
teller did not produce enough hundred dollar bills to satisfy 
him, he repeated the threat. He repeated the threat a third 
time to induce her to produce yet more money. Based on 
his words and actions the teller believed he had a gun and 
that he would shoot. She complied with his demands and 
he fled the bank with $4518.00. The bank teller did not see 
a weapon, nor is there any additional evidence, aside from 
his threats and actions, that he possessed a weapon at the 
time of the robbery. 
 
Wolfe was charged with one count of ar med bank robbery 
in violation of 18 U.S.C. S 2113(d), to which he entered a 
plea of not guilty. To sustain a conviction for armed robbery 
one of the elements the prosecutor must pr ove is that the 
defendant "assaulted any person, or put in jeopar dy the life 
of any person by the use of a dangerous weapon or device." 
18 U.S.C. S 2113(d) (emphasis added). The evidence 
presented at trial focused almost exclusively on whether the 
witnesses had correctly identified Wolfe as the bank robber.1 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
1. One of the officers responding to r obbery, Detective Culkin, viewed 
the 
bank surveillance video. Based on his observations of Wolfe at a local bar 
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Other than the teller's testimony regar ding his repeated 
threats, no evidence or arguments wer e presented on the 
issue of whether Wolfe possessed a danger ous weapon at 
the time he committed the robbery. With respect to this 
element of the offense, the District Court charged the jury, 
without objection, as follows: 
 
       The fourth essential element that the government must 
       prove beyond a reasonable doubt is that in committing 
       the crime, the defendant deliberately and intentionally 
       assaulted [the teller] or put her life in jeopardy by the 
       use of a dangerous weapon. . . . 
 
       *** 
 
       The government must prove beyond a r easonable 
       doubt that the defendant, during the commission of a 
       bank robbery, committed acts or said wor ds that would 
       have caused an ordinary person to reasonably expect 
       to die or face serious injury by the defendant's use of 
       a dangerous weapon. 
 
This charge permitted the jury to convict if they concluded 
that Wolfe's words or actions could have reasonably led the 
teller to believe that he might use a danger ous weapon, 
regardless of whether the jury believed he actually had a 
weapon. The jury reached a guilty verdict that same day. 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
on prior occasions, as well as his observations that on the night before 
the robbery he saw Wolfe wearing clothes similar to those worn by the 
robber, he opined that Wolfe was the robber. The FBI ran a record check 
on Wolfe revealing that he had outstanding parole violation warrants and 
that his parole officer, Thiel, was actively investigating to determine 
his 
whereabouts. Officer Theil was shown the surveillance video. Based on 
his observations of Wolfe during the four tofive years that he was under 
supervision, as well as his recollections that during a recent interview 
Wolfe had been wearing clothes similar to those worn by the robber, he 
also concluded Wolfe was the robber . When the authorities learned of 
Wolfe's whereabouts and went to arr est him, he was found hiding in the 
ceiling. He was arrested pursuant to the par ole warrant violations. A 
lawful search of Wolfe's personal pr operty revealed a bank bag 
containing over $1000 in cash. Shortly after W olfe's arrest, two bank 
tellers were presented with a photographic array and each of them 
independently identified Wolfe as the bank robber. 
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The District Court imposed a sentence of 21 years and 10 
months. 
 
II. 
 
The defendant now stipulates that there was sufficient 
evidence at trial to prove that he committed the lesser 
offense of bank robbery by intimidation, in violation of 18 
U.S.C. S 2113(a). However, he appeals his conviction for the 
greater offense of armed bank r obbery on the ground that 
there was insufficient evidence to pr ove the "use of a 
dangerous weapon" as required for a conviction under 
S 2113(d). Wolfe argues ther e was insufficient evidence for a 
jury to conclude beyond a reasonable doubt that he 
actually possessed a dangerous weapon during the 
commission of the robbery. This appeal cannot, however, be 
analyzed as a simple sufficiency of the evidence claim 
because the jury charge allowed a conviction if the jury 
concluded that the teller reasonably believed W olfe had a 
weapon and that he might use it. That is, the char ge 
allowed the jury to convict regardless of whether they 
concluded he actually possessed a weapon when he r obbed 
the bank. Therefore, we must review both the sufficiency of 
the evidence to convict Wolfe under S 2113(d) and the 
propriety of the jury instructions that allowed conviction 
based solely on the teller's reasonable belief that Wolfe had 
a weapon. 
 
Because Wolfe did not raise an objection at trial to either 
the sufficiency of the evidence or the jury char ge we will 
reverse only if we find "plain err or." Fed.R.Crim. P. Rule 
52(b); United States v. Turcks, 41 F .3d 893, 897 (3d Cir. 
1994); United States v. Gaydos, 108 F .3d 505, 509 (3d Cir. 
1997) (where the defendant does not preserve insufficiency 
issue by filing a timely motion for a judgment of acquittal, 
sufficiency of the evidence is reviewed under a plain error 
standard). This standard is met when ther e is an "error" 
that is "plain" and that "affects substantial rights." United 
States v. Olano, 507 U.S. 725, 732, 113 S.Ct. 1770, 1777, 
123 L.Ed.2d 508 (1993); Turcks, 41 F .3d at 897. A court's 
deviation from a legal rule constitutes "err or". Olano, 507 
U.S. at 732, 113 S.Ct. at 1777, 123 L.Ed.2d 508; Turcks, 
41 F.3d at 897. A "plain" error is one that is "clear" or 
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"obvious." Id. An error is deemed to have "affected 
substantial rights" if it was prejudicial in that it affected the 
outcome of the District Court proceedings. Olano, 507 U.S. 
at 733, 113 S.Ct. at 1778, 123 L.Ed.2d 508; Tur cks, 41 
F.3d at 897. Under plain error r eview, the defendant bears 
the burden of establishing that the err or prejudiced the 
jury's verdict. Turcks, 41 F .3d at 898. Even if the defendant 
establishes the existence of plain error , Rule 52(b) leaves to 
the sound discretion of the Court of Appeals the decision 
whether to correct the error. While the Court of Appeals has 
the authority to order correction when these elements are 
met, it is not required to do so. Id.  Instead, "we [ ] exercise 
our discretion `where the defendant is actually innocent, or 
where, regardless of the defendant's innocence or guilt, the 
error `seriously affect[s] the fairness, integrity or public 
reputation of judicial proceedings.' " Turcks, 41 F.3d at 897. 
See also Olano, 507 U.S. at 732, 113 S.Ct. at 1777, 123 
L.Ed.2d 508. 
 
A defendant must move for a judgment of acquittal at the 
conclusion of the evidence to properly pr eserve for appeal 
issues regarding the sufficiency of the evidence. United 
States v. Wright-Barker, 784 F.2d 161, 170-71 (3d Cir. 
1986). Wolfe failed to so move. Nonetheless, we will review 
the sufficiency of the evidence under the plain error 
standard because, as we have previously held, the 
prosecution's failure to prove an essential element of the 
offense constitutes plain error under Rule 52(b) of the 
Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure. Gaydos, 108 F.3d at 
509. We review the record in the light most favorable to the 
prosecution to determine whether any rational trier of fact 
could have found proof of guilt beyond a r easonable doubt 
based on the available evidence. Jackson v. V irginia, 443 
U.S. 307, 99 S.Ct. 2781, 61 L.Ed.2d 560 (1979). 
 
A conviction for armed bank robbery under 18 U.S.C. 
S 2113(d) requires proof that, while robbing a federally 
insured bank, the defendant put in jeopar dy the life of 
another "by the use of a dangerous weapon or device." The 
Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit has not yet 
addressed the application of this statute in a case where 
the defendant stated he had a weapon, appear ed to have 
his hand on a weapon, and threatened to use that weapon, 
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but never actually displayed a weapon during a r obbery. 
The government argues that words and gestures that lead 
a victim to believe a robber is armed constitute the "use of 
a dangerous weapon or device" within the meaning of the 
statute regardless of whether the defendant actually 
possesses a weapon. In other words, the danger ous device 
being employed in the robbery was Wolfe's threat to shoot. 
Were we to adopt this interpretation of the statute the 
prosecution would be relieved of the bur den to prove that 
the defendant actually had a weapon and would only have 
to prove that the defendant said he had a weapon. Wolfe 
not only argues that threatening wor ds and gestures are 
not a dangerous device, but also that, absent some 
corroborating evidence, threats and gestur es alone are 
insufficient evidence to establish beyond a r easonable 
doubt that a robber actually possessed a danger ous 
weapon. We decline to adopt either interpr etation and 
instead conclude that, while threats themselves are not a 
"dangerous device" within the meaning of the statute, these 
same threats may be considered by the jury as evidence 
that a defendant actually had a dangerous device or 
weapon. It is a subtle, but important, distinction. 
 
Threatening words and gestures do not, in and of 
themselves, constitute a dangerous device within the 
meaning of 18 U.S.C. S 2113(d). The crime of bank robbery 
occurs when a person obtains or attempts to obtain money 
or valuables from a federally insured bank"by force and 
violence, or by intimidation." 18 U.S.C. S 2113(a). The 
commission of bank robbery under S 2113(a) carries a 
penalty of not more than twenty years imprisonment 
and/or a fine of not more than $5,000. The much more 
serious offense of aggravated bank robbery occurs when a 
person, "in committing, or attempting to commit, any 
offense defined in subsections (a) and (b) of this section, 
assaults any person, or puts in jeopardy the life of any 
person by the use of a dangerous weapon or device." 18 
U.S.C. S 2113(d). This offense carries a steeper maximum 
penalty of twenty-five years imprisonment and/or afine of 
not more than $10,000. Thus, on its face, the statute 
clearly differentiates between robberies committed 
employing force or intimidation and robberies committed 
with the aid of dangerous weapons or devices. 
 
                                6 
  
An interpretation of the statute that characterizes a 
threat as a "dangerous device," r egardless of whether the 
robber actually possesses a dangerous device such as a 
gun or knife, would render S 2113(a) lar gely superfluous 
thereby contravening established principles of statutory 
interpretation. Under such an interpretation a robber who 
walked into a bank, demanded money and threatened to 
shoot, but who was apprehended on the spot and found to 
be unarmed would be guilty of aggravated bank robbery 
under S 2113(d) because when he made the thr eat he used 
a dangerous device. The United States Solicitor General and 
our sister Circuits have rejected this interpretation as 
inconsistent with the plain language and legislative intent 
behind SS 2113(a) and (d). See, e.g., McLaughlin v. United 
States, 476 U.S. 16, 106 S.Ct. 1677, 90 L.Ed.2d 15 (1986); 
United States v. Ray, 21 F.3d 1134, 1137-38 (D.C. Cir. 
1994); United States v. Perry, 991 F .2d 304, 309 (6th Cir. 
1993). A robber who uses threats of violence to accomplish 
a robbery, but who is unarmed, is guilty of the lesser 
offense of bank robbery under S 2113(a). For this Court to 
conclude that these threats of violence ar e, in and of 
themselves, a dangerous device would cir cumvent 
legislation designed to recognize and deter the increased 
danger presented by criminals who commit crimes while 
carrying weapons or devices that appear to be weapons. See 
Perry, 991 F.2d at 310. We cannot interpret the statute in 
a manner inconsistent with this explicit distinction by 
construing threatening words as a "dangerous device" 
under S 2113(d). We conclude that in or der to sustain a 
conviction under S 2113(d) the prosecution bears the 
burden of proving that the robber had a dangerous weapon 
or device and that he used it. 
 
While Wolfe's threats to shoot ar e not, in and of 
themselves, a dangerous device, these same thr eats may be 
considered by a jury as relevant evidence on the issue of 
whether Wolfe actually possessed a weapon when he robbed 
the bank. We are in agreement with other Courts of Appeal 
that have wrestled with this issue that, when a robber says 
he has a gun and that he will use it, a jury may r easonably 
infer that he did have a gun.2Ray, 21 F.3d at 1140; United 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
2. The dissent maintains that this holding ef fectively relieves the 
prosecution of its burden to prove actual possession of a weapon and 
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States v. Levi, 45 F.3d 453, 457 (D.C. Cir. 1995); United 
States v. Ferguson, 211 F.3d 878, 884 (5th Cir. 2000). 
During the robbery, Wolfe told the teller no less than three 
times that he had a gun and that he would use it. Levi, 45 
F.3d at 457 (a defendant "may be convicted of aggravated 
bank robbery . . . in which he either stated that he had a 
gun or threatened to blow off the teller's head. Both 
statements are sufficient evidence for the jury reasonably to 
conclude that the robber indeed had a gun"). The act of 
gesturing with his arm in his jacket pocket is additional 
evidence the jury is entitled to evaluate in considering the 
truth of his claim that he was armed.3 In Wolfe's case it 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
instead requires only that it prove the defendant said he had a weapon. 
[Dissent at 12]. This generalization overlooks the rule clearly set forth 
in 
this opinion -- the prosecution must pr ove actual possession of a 
dangerous weapon in order to sustain a conviction under S 2113(d). Our 
holding simply leaves to the trier of fact the decision of whether to 
credit 
a defendant's own statements, made during the course of a robbery, that 
he was armed. However, it does not, as the dissent implies, require a 
jury to find that a defendant was armed based on such statements. 
3. At the trial, an eyewitness to the robbery testified as follows 
regarding 
Wolfe's threatening "gestures": 
 
       Q: Could you . . . tell us what happened to you on that day? 
 
       A: . . . . I was -- just had finished taking care of a customer. 
Hum, 
       and another customer approached my window. When I looked 
       up the gentleman pushed a bag in front of me. He had his hand 
       in his jacket and he told me that he had a gun and he wanted 
       the bag filled with money. 
 
(App. 110, lines 8-15). 
 
       Q: Maureen, you said he had his hand in his jacket when he 
       approached your window. By his actions did he indicate to you 
       that he had a weapon? 
 
       A: Yes. He said he had a gun and he would shoot. 
 
(App. 112, lines 17-20). 
 
       Q: And the robber did not have gloves on so far as you could tell? 
 
       A: Not that I know of. I honestly don't know what was on his hand. 
       I only -- I was watching the -- the -- mor e the arm in his coat 
       and just watching what he was saying to me . . . 
 (App. 115, lines 2-8). 
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would have been uniquely reasonable for a jury to take 
Wolfe at his word and so conclude because he never once 
disputed the prosecution's contention on this point either 
by direct denials, on cross-examination of the eye 
witnesses, by the presentation of contrary evidence, or in 
his opening or closing statements. Instead, the defense 
chose to focus on the issue of the robber's identity and did 
not so much as assert that Wolfe was unar med when he 
robbed the bank. Indeed, it was never an issue in this case. 
Accordingly, viewing the evidence in the light most 
favorable to the prosecution, as we must, we hold that 
there was sufficient evidence for a r easonable jury to 
conclude Wolfe actually possessed a gun during the robbery 
of the Penn Security Bank and Trust Company. Because 
there was sufficient evidence to sustain the jury's 
conclusion that he actually possessed a gun, his thr eats to 
shoot unless the teller gave him money clearly constitute 
the "use" of a dangerous weapon within the meaning of the 
statute. 
 
Because the jury instructions made it irrelevant whether 
Wolfe actually had a dangerous weapon we must also 
consider the implications of the jury charge. As the above 
discussion indicates, a conviction under S 2113(d) requires 
proof that a defendant actually had a weapon. By 
instructing the jury that they could convict based solely on 
the teller's reasonable belief that Wolfe was armed, the 
District Court deviated from the correct legal rule when 
charging the jury and committed clear err or. Levi, 45 F.3d 
at 456; Ray, 21 F.3d 1140. We conclude, however, that this 
error did not affect substantial rights by altering the 
outcome of the proceedings; therefor e, it was not plain 
error. 
 
Under plain error review, Wolfe bears the burden of 
establishing that the error affected his rights by prejudicing 
the jury's verdict. Turcks, 41 F .3d at 898. Wolfe cannot 
meet that burden. The Supreme Court itself has cautioned 
that "[i]t is a rare case in which an improper instruction 
will justify reversal of a criminal conviction when no 
objection has been made in the trial court." Henderson v. 
Kibbe, 431 U.S. 145, 154, 97 S.Ct. 1730, 1736, 52 L.Ed.2d 
203 (1977). Not only did Wolfe fail to object to the 
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erroneous instructions, he did not even obliquely raise the 
issue of whether he had a weapon during the trial. The 
evidence presented at Wolfe's trial per mitted only one 
conclusion: he was armed. We cannot, therefore, conclude 
that the erroneous jury instruction prejudiced the jury's 
verdict. In light of the evidence presented at trial, we are 
confident that the jury would have convicted W olfe even if 
the appropriate instruction had been given. 
 
III. 
 
Because there was sufficient evidence to sustain Wolfe's 
conviction for aggravated bank robbery and because the 
erroneous jury instructions do not warrant a r eversal under 
the plain error standard, we will affir m Wolfe's conviction 
under 18 U.S.C. S 2113(d). For the for egoing reason, the 
District Court's judgment of June 19, 2000 will be affirmed. 
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ROBERT J. WARD, Senior District Judge, concurring in 
part and dissenting in part: 
 
I respectfully concur in part and dissent in part. Where 
a defendant threatens to use a dangerous weapon or 
device, but does not display an object reasonably perceived 
to be one, I concur that actual possession is r equired to 
sustain a conviction under 18 U.S.C. S 2113(d). However, I 
disagree with the majority that Wolfe's threats to use a gun, 
and these threats alone, are sufficient to establish actual 
possession beyond a reasonable doubt. 
 
Although I agree with the majority that W olfe's threats 
"may be considered by a jury as relevant evidence on the 
issue of whether Wolfe actually possessed a weapon," 
[Majority Opinion at 7], I do not believe that such threats 
are enough to uphold the verdict in this case. The only 
"relevant evidence" presented at trial that Wolfe was armed 
was that he verbally threatened to use a gun and that his 
hand was in his jacket or coat.1 As noted in the Solicitor 
General's brief in McLaughlin v. United States , 476 U.S. 16 
(1986), "[r]obbers frequently pass notes to tellers 
demanding money and suggesting that they are ar med, 
although they may be unarmed." Brief for the United States 
at 18, McLaughlin, 476 U.S. 16 (1986) (No. 85-5189), 
reprinted in Appendix at 179, 188. In the present case, 
where the only evidence of actual possession is Wolfe's 
threats, there is a strong possibility that he may have been 
deceiving the teller in an effort to intimidate her. The jury 
should not be permitted to infer actual possession beyond 
a reasonable doubt from these threats alone since this 
"approves precisely the kind of speculating which jurors 
should not do and courts should not permit much less 
encourage them to do." United States v. Ray , 21 F.3d 1134, 
1145 (D.C. Cir. 1994) (Will, J., concurring in part and 
dissenting in part). 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
1. Despite the majority's statement that "[t]he act of gesturing with his 
arm in his jacket pocket is additional evidence" of whether Wolfe was 
armed, [Majority Opinion at 8], the trial record indicates only that 
Wolfe's 
hand was in his jacket or coat; there was no mention that he "gestured" 
or that his hand was in his "pocket" (as opposed to any other part of his 
jacket or coat). See Appendix at 110, 112, 115. 
 
                                11 
  
Furthermore, the majority expresses concern that if it 
were to adopt the government's interpr etation of the 
statute, under which words and gestures would constitute 
the use of a dangerous weapon or device, "the prosecution 
would be relieved of the burden to pr ove that the defendant 
actually had a weapon and would only have to pr ove that 
the defendant said he had a weapon." [Majority Opinion at 
6] (emphasis added). Yet, by then holding that the jury can 
infer possession from mere threats, the majority effectively 
achieves the same outcome: the prosecution is permitted to 
establish that the defendant actually had a weapon only by 
proving that he said he had a weapon. 
 
In addition, the majority's conclusion produces another 
result that it seeks to avoid: "circumvent[ing]" the 
legislation and rendering 18 U.S.C. S 2113(a) "largely 
superfluous." [Majority Opinion at 7]. By definition, every 
violation of S 2113(a) involves the use of"force and violence, 
or . . . intimidation." 18 U.S.C. S 2113(a). An unarmed 
robber's threat to use a weapon establishes this 
intimidation element. Therefore, the majority's holding that 
the same threat alone is sufficient for a jury to infer 
possession blurs, if not eliminates, the distinction between 
S 2113(a) and S 2113(d). Indeed, under the majority's 
holding, S 2113(a) will now be reserved only for those rare 
occasions when a robber walks into a bank demanding 
money, but neither states that he has a weapon nor 
displays what can be perceived as a danger ous weapon or 
device. 
 
The hypothetical jury charge crafted by the dissenting 
judge in Ray to demonstrate the confusion r esulting from 
the Ray majority's holding aptly illustrates the anomalous 
result produced by the majority in the pr esent case: 
 
        The law is clear that you may not convict the 
       defendant under S 2113(d) merely because he said he 
       had a gun or other dangerous device and gestur ed or 
       acted like he did but never displayed or exhibited any 
       object which looked like or could reasonably have been 
       believed to be a gun or other dangerous object. 
       However, if you are satisfied fr om his words, actions or 
       gestures that he did have a hidden gun or other 
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       dangerous object even though he did not display it, 
       then you may convict him under S 2113(d). 
 
Ray, 21 F.3d at 1144 (Will, J., concurring in part and 
dissenting in part). 
 
The District of Columbia Circuit is the only circuit 
squarely to decide that a jury can infer actual possession 
solely from a defendant's threats. See, e.g., Ray, 21 F.3d at 
1141. Although other circuit courts have quoted language 
from Ray with approval, in each of those cases threats were 
not the only evidence of gun possession. See United States 
v. Ferguson, 211 F.3d 878, 884 (5th Cir. 2000) (additional 
evidence that defendant had used a gun in several similar 
robberies and that a gun was found in his apartment); 
United States v. Jones, 84 F.3d 1206, 1209, 1211 (9th Cir. 
1996) (additional evidence that defendant abandoned a 
revolver, holster, and ammunition in a getaway vehicle). 
Since the Ferguson decision cited in the majority opinion 
did not rule on the narrow issue presented here and in 
Ray, Ferguson is inapplicable. 
 
Because I believe that there is insufficient evidence to 
sustain a conviction under S 2113(d), I am also of the 
opinion that the clearly erroneous jury char ge constituted 
plain error in that it affected the defendant's substantial 
rights by misleading the jury on the issue of the 
defendant's "use of a dangerous weapon." Accordingly, I 
would vacate the judgment and remand for r esentencing 
under S 2113(a). 
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